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In 2018, China’s foreign relations were dominated by the centralization of its foreign 
policy-making, designed to strengthen the hold of the Chinese Communist Party and 
the Chinese president himself on the decision-making system. The aim was to create 
a more efficient system that could better serve the interests of the country, eager to 
realize its national dream. At the same time, however, China appeared occupied in 
the exercise of its diplomacy of great power with Chinese characteristics, both at home 
– hosting three major global events – and internationally – playing a central role 
in the peace process that took place on the Korean peninsula. In this sphere China’s 
foreign policy witnessed a quite unexpected, but long awaited success; the North Ko-
rean leader’s repeated visits to the country that marked the end of years of speculation 
concerning the state of their brotherhood alliance and Beijing’s weak grip on its ally.
Meanwhile, during the year under review, China had to manage very troubled rela-
tions with the US as a direct consequence of the trade war unleashed by the Trump 
administration, which went far beyond trade imbalances and commercial issues. 
Interestingly, the tense situation created by the US had some surprising effects: a 
definitive thawing of relations between China and Japan, one the one hand; and a 
strengthening of those between China-EU, on the other.
At the closing of the period under review, all the pieces of the puzzle appeared to be in 
the right place, and China was in a position to declare, without hesitation, that no-
one could afford to dictate to the Chinese people what should or should not be done, 
as Xi Jinping opined at the conference celebrating the 40th anniversary of the reform 
and opening-up, on 18 December.
1. Introduction 
The present article focuses on China’s foreign policy which, in the 
year under review, was marked by a process of centralization, and culminat-
ing with the strengthening of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the 
Chinese president himself on the decision-making system. The purpose was 
to forge a more efficient system that could better serve the interests of the 
country, eager to fulfil its national «dream» by 2049, on the occasion of the 
centenary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 
1.  The concept of «China dream» (中国梦) or national «dream» is closely associ-
ated with Xi Jinping, who began promoting the term as a slogan in a high-profile visit 
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This process was begun by Xi Jinping when he came to power and 
was confirmed by the 19th Party Congress (October 2017), and later by the 
annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), in March 2018. The 
key element of this process was the reform of the Chinese decision-making 
system, which included both the reorganization of institution building and 
the amendment of the former procedures of foreign policy decision-making.
In its new demeanour – which can be summarized in the new concept 
of «great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics» (中国特色大国外
交) – China hosted three key global events, namely the annual conference 
of the Boao Forum for Asia, the 18th edition of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), and the 7th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FO-
CAC). All three events demonstrated China’s growing assertiveness and 
confirmed its central role on the international scene, with special reference 
to Asia and Africa. At the same time China was able to play a central role 
in the Korean peninsula peace process which, ostensibly at least, took great 
leaps in the year under review. 
Beyond Beijing’s strong diplomatic activism, two main facts domi-
nated Chinese foreign relations in 2018, highlighting the highs and lows of 
the process of realizing the national «dream». The most surprising, and un-
expected one, was the sudden rapprochement between Beijing and Pyong-
yang, symbolized by the North Korean leader’s frequent visits to China – 
three in less than three months – which marked the end of the never-ending 
speculation concerning the state of the brotherhood alliance between the 
two countries and Beijing’s weak grip on its ally. 
The second event regarded the PRC’s troubled relations with the Unit-
ed States of America. Indeed, China was at the centre of a trade war unleashed 
by Donald Trump’s administration which went far beyond any commercial 
issues. On the one hand it contributed to the thawing in relations between 
China and Japan, while at the same time facilitated the revival of the trilateral 
negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between China, Japan and 
South Korea. On the other hand, it stimulated the strengthening of relations 
between China and the European Union (EU), as shown by the positive re-
to the Beijing National Museum of China, in the aftermath of his promotion to the top 
Communist Party post, in November 2012. But the propaganda storm began soon after 
he became president in 2013, Xi having used the term numerous times in his first ad-
dress to the nation as head of state on 17 March. Since then the concept has been widely 
disseminated in official statements, becoming an integral part of the political ideology 
of Xi Jinping. Xi interprets the «China dream» as a process of «great rejuvenation» of 
the Chinese nation (中国复兴) and describes it as achieving «two centenarian goals» (
两个一百年奋斗目标): the material goal of becoming a «moderately well-off society» (
小康社会) by 2021, which marks the CCP’s 100th anniversary, and the modernization 
goal of transforming China into «a wealthy and strong socialist country» (富强的社会主
义国家) by about 2049, which will mark the 100th anniversary of PRC’s founding. To 
achieve both goals China has to resort to an active diplomacy (积极外交) while defini-
tively abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s low profile strategy (韬光养晦).
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sults of 20th EU-China Summit, resumed in its final Joint Statement, even 
despite the growing tensions around the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and 
its impact especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries.
The article concludes with an update on the ubiquitous BRI, that in 
2018 celebrated its 5th anniversary, amid continuing expansion and growing 
criticism. This could in the long term potentially derail China’s carefully 
laid plans, as clearly demonstrated by the attitude of India in the SCO. 
2. Towards the centralization of foreign policy decision-making
Since coming to power Xi Jinping has asserted himself as a strong lead-
er and has impressed a strong guide both domestically and internationally, 
inaugurating a new era of proactive foreign policy, mainly symbolized by the 
launch of significant international initiatives. At the same time, he has strived 
to represent China as a responsible «global citizen», committed to the defence 
of free trade, multilateralism, the environment, respect for the principle of 
legality, while guaranteeing the country’s «right to speak» (话语权), namely 
the power to dictate international rules and set the political agenda.2
Little wonder that some observers interpreted his opening speech at 
the 19th Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Congress as confirmation of the 
end of the era of low profile, and the beginning of a new one characterized 
by greater self-confidence, increasing objectives and an unequivocal desire 
to occupy a global leadership position together with the United States and 
other major powers. 
Such interpretation was corroborated by Xi Jinping’s 2017 New Year 
speech, broadcast simultaneously on CCTV and CGTN (the main overseas 
Chinese broadcaster), with English subtitles, when he declared that «as a 
great responsible country, China has something to say», and pledged with-
out hesitation that his country «will be the keeper of the international or-
der».3 Again in his speech at the conference celebrating the 40 years of 
«reform and opening-up» (改革开放) on 18 December 2018, Xi Jinping de-
2. ‘Xi Jinping to be first Chinese president to attend Davos World Economic 
Forum’, South China Morning Post, 11 January 2017; ‘Xi’s Davos visit shows Chinese 
wisdom, confidence’, China Daily, 20 January 2017; ‘Xi says China stays committed 
to upholding world peace’, Xinhuanet, 19 January 2017; Huang Zheping, ‘Chinese 
President Xi Jinping has vowed to lead the «new world order»’, Quartz, 22 February 
2017; Charlotte Gao, ‘«A Community of Shared Future»: One Short Phrase for UN, 
One Big Victory for China?’, The Diplomat, 5 November 2017.
3.  Charlotte Gao, ‘2018: China Vows to Be the Keeper of International Order’, 
The Diplomat, 2 January 2018. Although it is not entirely clear whether Xi Jinping was 
referring to the present Western liberal order created by the US and its allies, or to a 
new international order anchored to China’s ambitions, culture and desires, his refer-
ence to the promotion of a «community of shared future for mankind for the benefit of 
all people in the world», induces observers to believe he was referring to the latter. For 
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clared in a very straightforward way that «No one is in a position to dictate 
to the Chinese people what should or should not be done».4
In order to sustain this new more visible and strong profile in for-
eign relations, the Chinese leadership undertook a process of centralizing 
foreign policy-making, giving Xi Jinping and the CCP greater control to 
«provide strong support for opening new horizons in China’s diplomacy» (
为开创对外工作新局面提供坚强保障).5 
The process started with the establishment of an unprecedented Na-
tional Security Commission (NSC), in April 2014, chaired by Xi, aimed at 
solving the coordination problems of both domestic and foreign policy de-
cision-making. It continued with the concentration of power in the hands of 
the Chinese president who collected so many significant positions to merit 
the designation «chairman of everything», and later being hailed as the 
party «core» (核心) leader.6 
In 2018 the continuation of this process was reflected both in the 
changes of the foreign policy leadership team as defined at the 19th Party 
Congress and confirmed during the annual session of the NPC in March 
2018, and in the upgrade of the Central Leading Small Group on Foreign 
Affairs (中央外事工作领导小组), headed by Xi, to Central Foreign Affairs 
Commission (外事委员会). 
As analyzed in Francesca Congiu’s article in this same issue of Asia 
Maior,7 this concentration of power affected the party. The factions close to 
former leaders Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin were largely marginalized, while 
the personnel appointments to top foreign policy-making positions were all 
closely linked with the Chinese president and his major concepts and initia-
tives. The new Politburo Standing Committee members Wang Huning and 
Wang Yang, and the new Politburo member Yang Jiechi, had been deputy 
leaders of the BRI leading group since 2014; Wang Huning, being one of 
the top political theorists, was also supposed to be behind the concept of 
the «China Dream».8 
As for the reshuffle of government and party institutions, it involved 
the upgrade of four Central Leading Small Groups (中央领导小组) – includ-
ing the one for Foreign Affairs – to the rank of commissions (委员会), with 
more information on China’s new imagined international system see Bradley A. Thayer 
& John M. Friend, ‘The World According to China’, The Diplomat, 3 October 2018.
4.  Lili Kuo, ‘Xi Jinping: president warns other nations not to «dictate» to Chi-
na’, The Guardian, 18 December 2018. 
5.  ‘中央外事工作会议在京举行’ (‘The Central Conference on Work Relating to 
Foreign Affairs was Held in Beijing’), 人民日报 (People’s Daily), 30 November 2014. 
6.  Wang Shicheng, ‘Xi Jinping’s centralization of Chinese foreign policy deci-
sion-making power’, East Asian Policy, September 2017, pp. 34-42.
7.  Francesca Congiu, ‘China 2018: Bringing the Party back into State Insti-
tutions’.
8.  Thomas Eder, ‘China’s New Foreign Policy Setup’, The Diplomat, 1 August 
2018. 
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the aim of strengthening the authority of the Communist Party and improv-
ing policy coordination across the departments. All the commissions were 
put under the chair of Xi Jinping, while the other members of the Politburo 
Standing Committee served as his deputy.9
Of particular interest for the purpose of this article is the Central 
Foreign Affairs Commission’s replacement of the former Central Leading 
Small Group on Foreign Affairs as the central institution in charge of co-
ordinating China’s foreign policy. It is useful to underline that the Central 
Leading Small Group on Foreign Affairs was set up in its present form at the 
beginning of the 1980s with the precise goal of coordinating China’s often 
disjointed foreign policy. That said, its general office, which was located in-
side the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was reportedly often bypassed by other 
government agencies because it was seen as low-ranking and ineffective, 
and the group appeared to be incapable of coordinating China’s foreign 
policy. The same Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been troubled for a long 
time by its inability to behave coherently due to the presence of a «cacopho-
ny of voices», i.e. multiple actors striving to influence foreign policy.10
The new Commission held its first meeting on 15 May 2018, shed-
ding light on the top policy-making body for the future country’s diplomacy, 
as well as its direction.11 Xi Jinping was revealed as its head, Premier Li 
Keqiang its deputy head, while Vice President Wang Qishan (CCP’s former 
anti-corruption chief), Wang Huning, and Vice Premier Han Zheng were 
included in its membership. 
In his opening speech Xi Jinping called for enhancement of the Par-
ty’s centralized and unified leadership on foreign affairs and pledged to 
continue promoting the BRI – which in the meantime had been included in 
the party constitution and identified with the «China Dream.»12 In particu-
lar, Xi called for a correct understanding and dealing with the changes of 
the current international situation, and to forge ahead in opening up new 
prospects of «major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics», so as 
to make a greater contribution to the realization of the two centenary goals 
and the Chinese dream of great national renewal.13 
9.  Helena Legarda, ‘In Xi’s China, the center takes control of foreign affairs’, 
The Diplomat, 1 August 2018. 崔士方, ‘从“小组治国”到“委员会治国” | 外交部’, 大纪元
时报 (Cui Shifang, ‘From «group governance» to «Commission governing the coun-
try»’, The Epoch Times, 22 March 2018.
10.  For an in-depth analysis about the topic, see Linda Jakobson & Dean Knox, 
New Foreign Policy Actors in China, SIPRI Policy Papers, vol. 51, September 2010. 
11.  ‘New Foreign Affairs Commission Sets Tone for China’s Diplomacy’, Caixin, 
16 May 2018.
12.  This was all the more important since, as already pointed out by Francesca 
Congiu in her article in this same issue, the «China Dream» had definitely taken the 
place of economic growth as a major source of political legitimation. 
13.  ‘Xi stresses centralized, unified leadership of CPC Central Committee over 
foreign affairs’, China Daily, 15 May 2018.
BarBara Onnis
48
In so doing the leadership was sending a clear message, namely that 
the party alone controlled China’s foreign affairs and that it would not tol-
erate policies or actions that might compromise China’s efforts to become a 
global power by 2049, the centenary of the PRC.
That said, a more coordinated foreign policy could prove to be a great 
advantage not only for Beijing, but also for its diplomatic counterparts, 
since it would help eliminate the conflicting messages resulting from the 
presence of a multitude of actors, reduce the instances of diplomatic misun-
derstanding and thus assure a better comprehension of the Chinese system.
3. The «great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics» at work 
As already seen in Francesca Congiu’s essay in this same issue of Asia 
Maior, during the first session of the 13th NPC, «Xi Jinping Thought on 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era» (习近平新时代中国
特色社会主义思想) was introduced into the PRC’s constitution. According 
to some Chinese experts in the foreign policy context, the «New Era» (新时
代) concept indicates a transition to a more active approach to diplomacy, 
while the emphasis on «Chinese characteristics» (中国特色) implies that the 
Chinese government would conduct its international affairs consistent with 
traditional Chinese cultural values, rather than align with Western models 
and principles.14 That was exactly what the new concept of «great power diplo-
macy with Chinese characteristics» (中国特色大国外交) implied.15
The events that best showcased China’s new diplomatic concept and 
China’s opening-up drive were the three key global events the country 
hosted during the year under review, namely the Boao Forum for Asia, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Forum on China-Africa Co-
operation. Interestingly, they each presented new features as compared to 
previous editions. 
14.  The «Chinese characteristics» are frequently used by Chinese leaders to in-
dicate the adaptation of foreign ideologies or concepts to Chinese specific conditions. 
This tendency began with the process of sinization of Marxism (马克思主义中国化) 
by Mao Zedong, and continued with the affirmation of the «socialism with Chinese 
characteristics» (中国特色社会主义) with Deng Xiaoping. In foreign policy the «Chi-
nese characteristics» refer to China’s ambition to shape the global order according to 
its national interests. 
15.  Zhang Lihua, Ye Zicheng, Wang Hongxu, et al., ‘What does «great power di-
plomacy with Chinese characteristics» mean?’, Carnegie-Tsinghua, Center for Global 
Policy, 20 April 2018. For further details see 郑泽光, ‘新时代的中国特色大国外交’, 国
际问题研究 (Zheng Zeguang, ‘The diplomacy of great powers with Chinese character-
istics in the new era’, Research on international issues) n. 3, 2018.
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3.1. The Boao Forum for Asia annual conference 
The Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) annual conference, which took place 
in Boao, a town in the southern island province of Hainan, from 8 to 10 
April, was the first since Xi Jinping was «unanimously re-elected» as Chinese 
president and the first since China’s commitment to building a «community 
with a shared future for humanity» (人类命运公同体) was written into the 
country’s constitution in March. 
According to Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, Xi’s attendance at 
the BFA annual conference at that historic moment – 2018 marked the 40th 
anniversary of «reform and opening-up» and the beginning of the imple-
mentation of the decisions taken at the 19th Party Congress – was of great 
significance in further promoting the «major-country diplomacy with Chi-
nese characteristics in the new era», building «a community with a shared 
future» for Asia and humanity, and advancing the cause of peace and de-
velopment.16 
Indeed, in his keynote speech delivered at the opening ceremony, 
Xi Jinping vowed non-stop effort in continuing the process of «reform and 
opening-up» and called for people around the world to work together to 
build a «community with a shared future for mankind» and make Asia and 
the world peaceful, prosperous and open, since China and the world could 
not develop without each other.17
Beyond this rhetoric, Xi’s speech was focused on four main themes – 
improvement in the market environment; market access for foreign firms; 
investment opportunities for foreigners, and the creation of a strengthened 
intellectual property protection regime in China for the benefit of foreign-
ers and the domestic economy. It was praised by both US experts and other 
Western observers.18 It is worth quoting the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) managing director Cristine Lagarde’s comments: «Xi’s speech added 
certainty and hope to the world today, and the world needs leadership like 
China».19
3.2. The 18th Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit
The 18th SCO summit, held between 9-10 June in East China’s coastal 
city of Qingdao, was the first following the crucial membership expansion 
to include India and Pakistan in June 2017; these were grounds enough to 
16.  ‘Chinese president to address opening ceremony of 2018 Boao Forum’, 
Xinhuanet, 3 April 2018.
17.  ‘Transcript: President Xi Addresses the 2018 Boao Forum for Asia in Hain-
an’, US-China Perception Monitor, 11 April 2018.
18.  Chen Weihua, ‘US experts praise keynote speech at Boao’, China Daily, 16 
April 2018; ‘Analysis of President Xi Jinping’s Boao Forum speech’, The Telegraph, 20 
April 2018.
19.  ‘Xi says China will continue to support free trade’, Xinhuanet, 10 April 2018.
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consider it a historical summit. Here the peculiar position of India must 
be highlighted, it being a member of the revived quadrilateral entente, or 
«Quad», which besides India, includes Australia, Japan, and the US.
For these reasons, since its formal inclusion in the SCO there has been 
an intense debate among observers mainly focused on doubts relating to In-
dia’s readiness to join the Organization while jointly safeguarding Western 
interests, as well as the kind of contribution New Delhi might make to it.20
Unsurprisingly, India was the only member state that did not endorse 
the BRI programme, as revealed in the «Qingdao Declaration», which 
named all member states, except one, as «reiterating support for China’s 
BRI» project.21 In defense of his position, as when in 2017 New Delhi de-
clined China’s invitation to join the first Belt and Road Forum in Beijing,22 
Indian prime minister Narendra Modi spoke of the need to «respect sov-
ereignty» in dealing with infrastructure projects. He was clearly signalling 
his government’s objection to a portion of the BRI, that is the China-Paki-
stan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – one of the six economic corridors un-
der the Initiative – which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Modi 
also specified that his country welcomed new connectivity projects «that are 
inclusive, sustainable, transparent, and those that respect the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of nations», adding that «connectivity with SCO and 
neighbours is a priority for India».23 In other words Modi made clear that 
India could not accept a project that would ignore its core concern on sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity – two main pillars of PRC’s foreign policy – 
and that would have the potential to greatly strengthen one of his country’s 
historical enemies. 
That said, Beijing was reportedly successful in obtaining India’s par-
ticipation in its effort to rally support for China in the trade dispute with 
the Trump administration,24 a matter of no secondary importance. Of even 
greater importance was the fact that India declined the invitation to be 
20.  Zamir Avan, ‘What will India’s role be in the SCO?’, Asia Times, 28 May 
2018. 
21. ‘Qingdao Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of Shanghai Coop-
eration Organization’, 10 June 2018, (http://eng.sectsco.org/documents). It should be 
noted that India was among the 50 countries that signed the agreement to establish 
the AIIB on 29 June 2015. 
22.  Michelguglielmo Torri & Diego Maiorano, ‘India 2017: Narendra Modi’s 
continuing hegemony and his challenge to China’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 267-280, 
esp. p. 285.
23.  Saibal Dasgupta, ‘India only SCO member to oppose China’s BRI’, The 
Times of India, 10 June 2018. For a better understanding of India’s position on the 
BRI, see Vinai Kaura, ‘Understanding India’s response to China’s Belt and Road’, 
The Asian Times, 10 June 2017; Musarat Amin & Rizwan Naseer, ‘Indian Opposition 
to Chinese Belt and Road Initiative: Response, Rationale and Action’, Central Asia 
Journal, No. 81, Winter 2018, pp. 13-34. 
24.  Saibal Dasgupta, ‘India only SCO member to oppose China’s BRI’, The 
Times of India, 10 June 2018.
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part of a US-led trilateral initiative (including also Japan and Australia), 
launched on 30 July to fund infrastructure projects in order to counter-
balance the BRI in the Indo-Pacific region.25 A decision that, according to 
specialists, was consistent with the country’s emphasis on multipolarity in 
the Indo-Pacific region and non-bloc security architecture, but reflected at 
the same time Modi’s government efforts to stabilize India’s relations with 
the PRC. This was in line with the positive tone that characterized bilateral 
relations in the final phases of 2017.26 The two countries held a series of 
engagements during the year under review, starting with Indian prime min-
ister’s informal summit with Xi Jinping in Wuhan on April 27-28.27 Another 
two meetings took place on the sidelines of major events, in addition to the 
SCO, such as the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in July, and the G-20 
in Buenos Aires at the end of November. In particular, during their last 
encounter both leaders agreed that there had been a «perceptible improve-
ment» in bilateral ties over the year.28
3.3. The 7th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
The 7th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) opened in Bei-
jing on 3 September at the Great Hall of the People with a keynote speech 
delivered by the Chinese president, entitled significantly «Work Together 
for Common Development and a Shared Future» (合作共赢携手构建更加紧
密的中非命运共同体). During the speech Xi announced that China would 
implement eight major initiatives with African countries in the following 
three years and beyond, covering fields such as industrial promotion, infra-
structure connectivity, trade facilities, and green development, in an evident 
attempt to rebrand China’s policy in Africa, and definitively dispel the accu-
sation of neocolonialism.29 
The state of relations and the different level of cooperation between 
the two parties were clearly shown in a promotional video produced by Chi-
na Global Network Television (CGNT) from China Media Group and aired 
at the start of the opening ceremony. Despite the banality and rhetoric of 
the title – «A Shared Dream, A Shared Future» (同心筑梦命运与共) – the 
video was a compilation of the many activities that China pursues in Africa 
on different levels, and in many ways is emblematic of China’s definitive 
25.  Dipanjan Roy Chaudury, ‘India not to join US-led counter to China’s BRI’, 
The Economic Times, 7 August 2018.
26.  Michelguglielmo Torri & Diego Maiorano, ‘India 2017: Narendra Modi’s 
continuing hegemony and his challenge to China’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 288-290. 
27.  Sutirtho Patranobis, ‘Wuhan Summit highlights: Narendra Modi invites Xi 
Jinping to India for informal summit in 2019’, Hindustantimes, 28 April 2018.
28.  ‘Modi, Xi say perceptible improvement in India-China relations post-Wu-
han summit’, The Hindu Business Line, 1 December 2018.
29.  Shannon Tiezzi, ‘FOCAC 2018: Rebranding China in Africa’, The Diplomat, 
5 September 2018.
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success on the continent.30 A symbolic aspect of that success is the fact that 
after Burkina Faso cut ties with Taiwan, at the end of May, 31 there remained 
only one country which failed to recognize the Republic of China (ROC), 
namely the Kingdom of Eswatini (formerly Swaziland). 
In fact the former Swaziland was the only African country absent at 
the important summit in September. 32 Speaking at a news briefing, China’s 
special envoy for Africa, Xu Jinghu, said that the issue of Eswatini and its 
lack of ties to Beijing was «an important question», but it was up to them to 
take the initiative. «On this issue we won’t exert any pressure. We’ll wait for 
the time to be right», he said, adding that he was convinced that that day 
would come sooner or later.33 
Interestingly, the 7th FOCAC was preceded in June by an unprece-
dented China-Africa Defense and Security Forum, a two-week conference 
hosted by China’s Ministry of National Defense in Beijing. The Forum, 
which focused on the security situation in Africa and the goal of deepen-
ing military cooperation between China and African nations, was attended 
by military leaders from nearly 50 African countries, clearly reflecting the 
expanding influence of China’s military on the continent.34 Contrary to the 
vision of the majority of experts who considered China’s relations with Afri-
can states to be mainly economically focused and far less interested in mil-
itary matters, the Forum was a demonstration of China’s growing military 
ties with Africa, 35 symbolized by the inauguration of the country’s first over-
seas «military base» in Djibouti in August 2017,36 and Beijing’s increasing 
contribution to UN peacekeeping missions.37 
30.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnVYlp2elLo
31.  ‘Burkina Faso cuts diplomatic ties with Taiwan after intense pres-
sure from China’, The Telegraph, 24 May 2018.
32.  Rick Noak, ‘All of Africa is now competing for Chinese money. Except for 
one country’, The Washington Post, 3 September 2018. 
33.  Ben Blanchard, ‘China says not putting pressure on Taiwan’s last Africa 
ally’, Reuters, 1 September 2018. 
34.  ‘China-Africa security forum concludes in Beijing’, Africa Times, 11 July 
2018.
35.  Lina Benabdallah, ‘China-Africa military ties have deepened. Here are 4 
things to know’, The Washington Post, 2 July 2018. For an overview of China’s growing 
involvement and the substantial changes of its participation in the UN peacekeeping 
operations, see ‘China’s Role in UN Peacekeeping’, ISDP, March 2018. 
36.  The Chinese government prefers the use of the more neutral term when 
referring to the Djibouti base, such as «support base» (保障基地), «logistical facility» (后
勤设施), or «protective facility» (防护设施). 
37.  Lina Benabdallah, ‘China-Africa military ties have deepened. Here are 4 
things to know’. 
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4. China-North Korea: the long-awaited renewal of the brotherhood alliance
In 2018 Sino-North Korean relations underwent major changes, the 
most striking of which related to the North Korean leader’s repeated visits 
to China. These visits marked the end of years of speculation concerning 
the state of the brotherhood alliance between the two countries, and Bei-
jing’s weak grip on its ally.38 The events that occurred on the Korean penin-
sula confirmed the centrality of China, and Beijing’s intention to assert its 
role, contradicting what Chinese officials had often reiterated in the last few 
years, namely that Beijing had very limited influence on the entire situation 
and that the US, not China, held the key to solving the North Korean nu-
clear issue.39 The meetings between the Chinese and North Korean leaders 
not only reinvigorated bilateral relations but underscored the necessity of 
respecting China’s interests and role vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula. That is 
why according to Scott Snyder and See-won Byun: «China’s rapid revival of 
its traditional role as North Korea’s staunchest supporter might prove to be 
the more strategically significant development».40
Kim Jong Un’s three visits in less than three months – the first in Bei-
jing on March 27-28, the second in Dalian on May 8, following the inter-Ko-
rean summit of 27 April, and again in Beijing on June 19-20, in the aftermath 
of the historical Singapore summit between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump 
– were of great symbolic significance for Beijing, and Xi Jinping in particular. 
For seven years the two allies never met. In 2014, Xi’s first visit to the Korean 
Peninsula as the PRC’s president had been to Seoul, not Pyongyang. North 
Korea’s best friend had snubbed it for its most bitter rival.41 
Given the relevance of the issue for both parties, it may be interest-
ing to briefly analyze the individual visits, focusing on the salient aspects 
of each of them. 
The first two trips were both «unofficial» and followed the tradition 
of China state media placing a moratorium on the announcement until 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leader was on his way 
home. The third was similar to the time-honoured visits of foreign heads of 
state, and as such heavily covered in newspapers and television news bul-
letins. Symbolically the most important visit was the first, in terms of both 
its timing and unexpectedness. Most probably the Chinese leadership had 
reached its decision to issue the invitation at the beginning of March after 
38.  Yun Sun, ‘The State of Play in Sino-DPRK Relations’, 38° North, 5 Septem-
ber 2018.
39.  Xuan Loc Doan, ‘China’s contradictions over the Korean Peninsula Issue’, 
Asia Times, 16 May 2018.
40.  Scott Snyder & See-won Byun, ‘China’s Multiple Roles in the Korean Dra-
ma’, Comparative Connections, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 83-92, esp. p. 84. 
41.  Marco Milani & Barbara Onnis, ‘Penisola coreana 2014: «ombre» all’inter-
no e «luci» all’esterno’, Asia Maior 2014, p. 128.
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the surprise announcement that the US president would meet Kim Jong Un 
to discuss Pyongyang denuclearization; Beijing risked possible marginaliza-
tion in what were likely to be historical talks. One striking aspect concerned 
the style of the visit. Kim and his wife were «treated lavishly and showered 
with luxury gifts» by Xi Jinping (including expensive alcohol banned under 
UN sanctions).42 But of utmost importance was the deference showed by 
Kim Jong Un43 and the words pronounced by the North Korean leader in 
his toast to the Chinese president, as reported by the North Korean state 
news agency KCNA: «It is appropriate that my first trip abroad is in China’s 
capital, and my responsibility to consider continuing North Korea-China 
relations as valuable as life».44 That was a worthy accolade for all of China’s 
previous efforts, and one that allowed Beijing to save its face, finally. 
The second meeting, on 8 May in Dalian, projected quite strange-
ly the image of an already well-established relationship between the two 
leaders, despite the fact that it was «newborn», about to prepare for the 
Kim-Trump meeting. Chinese reports quoted Kim Jong Un as reiterating 
his country’s longstanding position that: «As long as relevant parties abolish 
their hostile policies and remove security threats against the DPRK, there is 
no need for the DPRK to be a nuclear state and denuclearization can be re-
alized», and referring to «phased and synchronous measures» to «eventually 
achieve» a formal peace treaty.45 For his part, Xi was reportedly emphasizing 
the restoration of the «traditional friendship» as fellow socialist countries, 
underscoring the «irreplaceably significant» role of high-level exchanges to 
the development of strategic communication, mutual trust, and the safe-
guarding of common interests, and pledging to strengthen people-to-peo-
ple exchanges between the two countries.46 At the same time Xi expressed 
China’s willingness «to continue to work with all relevant parties and play an 
active role in comprehensively advancing the process of peaceful resolution 
of the peninsula issue through dialogue, and realizing long-term peace and 
42.  Kim Jin-myung, ‘Xi Showered Kim Jong-un with Gifts During Visit’, The 
Chosun Ilbo, 5 April 2018.
43.  The Chinese state press agency Xinhua reported that during the encounter 
Xi referred to Kim as 你, while Kim referred to Xi as 您. Both pronouns mean ‘you’, 
but 您is more polite and respectful than 你. See Katsuji Nakazawa, ‘Kim Jong Un’s 
21-car train was packed with gifts and much more’, Asia Nikkei Review, 9 April 2018. 
44.  Emily Rauhala, ‘North Korea leader meets with Chinese president’s dur-
ing «unofficial visit» to Beijing’, The Washington Post, 27 March 2018. Asked for a 
comment on the visit, Aiden Foster Carter, honorary senior research fellow at Leeds 
University, said it would have been almost unthinkable for Kim to meet with Moon 
Jae-in and Donald Trump having never met Xi Jinping. James Griffiths, ‘Why Kim 
Jong Un Made a Secret Visit to China’, CNN, 5 April 2018. 
45.  Scott Snyder & See-won Byun, ‘China’s Multiple Roles in the Korean Dra-
ma’, p. 84.
46.  Ibid.
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stability in the region».47 Above all, the main message of the Dalian meeting, 
as pointed out by Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, was that Beijing would be 
included «in the process designed to pave the way for new political arrange-
ments on the peninsula».48 The «Panmunjom Declaration» made explicit 
reference to a peace treaty among three or four parties (North Korea, South 
Korea, the United States, and China).49 Not surprisingly Xi Jinping empha-
sized more the geostrategic importance of the renewed bilateral ties than 
the Peninsula’s denuclearization.
For the third visit on 19-20 June, as before, Kim Jong Un arrived in 
China much like any other foreign leader, landing at Beijing’s international 
airport and being driven by limousine to the city centre. Contrary to the 
previous two visits though, China state media announced that the Korean 
leader would be visiting Beijing for two days, shortly after his arrival in the 
capital50 and released photographs of Kim Jong Un meeting with Xi Jin-
ping at the Great Hall of the People – where foreign head of states are usu-
ally greeted – while the visit was in progress. The Chinese state press agency 
Xinhua reported that the two leaders «agreed to safeguard, consolidate and 
develop China-DPRK relations, and jointly push forward the sound mo-
mentum of peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula to make a positive 
contribution to safeguarding world and regional peace, stability, prosperity, 
and development», with almost no mention of denuclearization. In fact, an-
alysts agreed that Kim went to China to brief Xi on the Singapore summit, 
seek economic assistance, as well as show respect and deference to Beijing, 
which for its part was eager to underline its crucial role in talks between 
Pyongyang, Washington and Seoul.51 
In the eyes of many international observers China proved to be the 
biggest winner of the Singapore summit for two main reasons. On the one 
hand, the agreement adopted by Trump and Kim which granted a de facto 
dual suspension of North Korean tests and US-ROK joint military exercises 
(so called «freeze-for-freeze approach») was similar to the proposals that 
Beijing had been promoting for months. On the other hand, the US pres-
ident gave assurance of China’s inclusion in the formal replacement of the 
armistice with a Korean peace treaty.52 
47.  ‘Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-un hold talks in Dalian’, The Global Times, 8 May 
2018.
48.  Scott Snyder & See-won Byun, ‘China’s Multiple Roles in the Korean Dra-
ma’, p. 84.
49.  ‘[Full Text] Panmunjeom Declaration’, The Korea Times, 27 April 2018.
50.  On previous visits by North Korean leaders, including those of Kim Jong 
Un’ father and grandfather, the visits were not announced until after they had left the 
country and were on their way home.
51.  Lili Kuo, ‘Kim Jong-un meets Xi Jinping for third time’, The Guardian, 19 
June 2018.
52.  Scott Snyder & See-won Byun, ‘China’s Multiple Roles in the Korean Dra-
ma’, p. 85.
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At the same time, according to Andrei Lankov, one of the world’s 
leading Korea experts, and director of the Korea Risk Group, visiting Chi-
na for the third time in such a short period, Kim might be seeking to take 
advantage of the trade conflict between China and the US, and trying to 
deepen their rivalry to ensure they could not join forces against him, as 
happened with UN sanctions over North Korea’s weapons programme. In 
this regard, according to Lankov, Kim Jong Un was turning out to be a «very 
good diplomat».53 Last but not least, Pyongyang might be hoping Beijing 
would ease up on sanctions following the summits with Seoul and Washing-
ton. In any case, the support of its main ally was probably seen as essential 
for the redefinition of the North Korean foreign strategy.
A further step in the consolidation of the renovated Sino-North Ko-
rean strategic ties involved Li Zhanshu, chairman of the NPC, who at-
tended the 70th anniversary celebration of the DPRK’s founding in Pyong-
yang in September, as Xi‘s special representative.54 Previous reports had 
suggested Xi Jinping would travel to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong 
Un in what would have been the fourth summit between the two leaders 
in 2018, and the first visit by a Chinese leader to North Korea in over 
a decade.55 Reportedly there was intense debate in Beidaihe during the 
so-called «summer summit»,56 about Xi visiting Pyongyang for the cele-
brations. Not surprisingly the main focus of the debate was how his visit 
to North Korea might affect China’s difficult relations with the US.57 In 
fact, the Chinese president’s trip would have taken place at a time when 
the US President was pointing fingers at China for «[…] [not] helping with 
the process of denuclearization», due to trade tensions.58 But Xi Jinping’s 
decision to send a representative might also be related to concerns about 
China appearing to support North Korea’s nuclear weapons programmes, 
especially considering that Kim might choose to show off his nuclear-ca-
pable ballistic missiles at the parade.
Ultimately, the three visits reinforced China’s view that it was a driv-
ing force behind developments on the peninsula. This bolstered Beijing’s 
53.  Jane Perlez, ‘Kim Jong-un returns to China, this time with leverage’, The 
New York Times, 18 June 2018.
54.  Mo Jingxi, ‘Anniversary Celebrations show importance of DPRK ties, ex-
perts say’, China Daily, 10 September 2018; ‘China’s top legislator visits DPRK, at-
tends Foundation Day celebrations’, Xinhuanet, 10 September 2018. 
55.  Ankit Panda, ‘China’s Li Zhanshu to Visit North Korea As Xi Jinping’s Spe-
cial Representative’, The Diplomat, 5 September 2018.
56.  The Beidaihe meeting – held annually in the resort town in Hebei province 
– is where China’s leaders and elders from earlier generations meet in an informal 
setting in summer time for closed-door discussions that will set the tone for major 
domestic issues.
57.  Katsuji Nakazawa, ‘Xi-Kim honeymoon exposed as a façade’, Asia Nikkei, 
13 September 2018.
58.  Yun Sun, ‘The State of Play in Sino-DPRK Relations’.
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confidence in its relations with North Korea, thus averting its initial fear of 
exclusion and confirming its centrality in the issue.59 
As to the substance of the renewed bilateral ties, Andrei Lankov did 
not hesitate to express his reluctance since in his view there was no love lost 
between the two powers: «Let’s not have illusions. China and North Ko-
rea don’t see each other with any kind of mutual sympathy. There are zero 
warm feelings between the two countries». For Lankov, «China is seen as a 
potential threat, almost as much as the US is. The Chinese see North Korea 
as irrational, unreliable, ungovernable, highly dangerous».60 Put another 
way, considering the long history of scepticism and tension between the two 
sides, they could be considered at least «partners of convenience».
5. Strained relations between China and the US: beyond the iron fist on tariffs
As in the year 2017, in 2018 relations between China and the US 
presented many ups and downs, with strong deterioration on the commer-
cial side. In particular, the second part of the year under review was mainly 
characterized by the open hostility of the Trump administration towards 
China, as clearly shown by the trade war and the deep-rooted distrust be-
tween the two countries in many chapters of their foreign policy agenda, 
with special reference to the Korean peninsula. 
Since China’s inclusion in the list of countries that «challenge Amer-
ican power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American securi-
ty and prosperity» and «are determined to make economies less free and 
less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to 
repress their societies and expand their influence» (mentioned in the first 
Trump administration’s National Security Strategy61), the US president nev-
er ceased to underline his intentions of promoting American national inter-
ests, frequently repeating the «America First» mantra, while defending his 
right to do so. Accordingly, Washington launched what the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce considered as the «largest trade war in economic history» (经
济史上规模最大的贸易战).62
The dispute started in January 2018 when the US approved contro-
versial tariffs on imported washing machines and solar panels to «defend 
59.  ‘Is China being marginalized on Korean peninsula?’, The Global Times, 28 
May 2018. 
60.  ‘Xi and Kim’s Marriage of Convenience’, Foreign Policy, 22 June 2018.
61.  The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
December 2017 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Fi-
nal-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf), p. 12.
62. 商务部新闻办公室 (Ministry of Commerce Press Office), ‘商务部新闻发言人
就美国对340亿美元中国产品加征关税发表谈话’ (‘Ministry of Commerce spokesper-
son speaks on US tariffs on US$ 34 billion in Chinese products’), 6 July 2018.
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American workers, farmers, ranchers and businessmen»,63 in what was seen 
as Trump’s most significant trade move since his decision to abandon the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and renegotiate the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The move was highly criticized by both China 
and South Korea. In particular Samsung called the tariffs «a tax on every 
consumer who wants to buy a washing machine», while China, being the 
world’s biggest solar panel manufacturer, complained it would further dam-
age the global trade environment.64
But the «real» war started at the beginning of July and was aimed in 
the eyes of the American president at resolving some long-standing issues 
that went far beyond trade imbalances with the PRC. Trump was especially 
keen to punish Beijing for years of unfair trade policies, including stealing 
American intellectual property for the benefit of the Chinese economy, and 
the end of the policy of subsidy and state support to the technology and 
innovation programmes of Chinese state-owned enterprises.
Washington imposed three rounds of tariffs on Chinese products, to-
taling US$ 250 billion worth of goods. China retaliated in kind, imposing 
tariffs on items worth US$ 110 billion.65 Despite its brevity – it ended with 
a «90-day truce» signed in Buenos Aires by the two countries’ presidents on 
the sidelines of the G2066 – it risked damaging the global economy. At the 
beginning of October, the IMF released a report which projected a down-
turn in the global economy growth, a result of Trump’s trade policies.67
In the midst of growing trade tensions, other factors contributed to 
further deteriorate bilateral relations.68 In the second half of September 
Washington imposed sanctions against a unit of China’s Defense Ministry 
(China’s Equipment Development Department, EDD) and its government 
director (Li Shangfu) for purchasing Russian military equipment, in viola-
tion of a US sanction law punishing Moscow for meddling in the 2016 US 
elections. The sanctions blocked the EDD and his director from applying 
for export licenses and participating in the US financial system. The US 
also added them to the Treasury department’s list of specially designated 
individuals with whom Americans were barred from doing business.69 At 
63.  US slaps «America First» tariffs on washing machines and solar panels’, 
BBC news, 23 January 2018.
64.  Ibid. 
65.  Dorcas Wong & Alexander Chipman Koty, ‘The US-China Trade War: A 
Timeline’, China Briefing, 10 January 2019.
66.  Mark Landler, ‘U.S. and China Call Truce in Trade War’, The New York 
Times, 1 December 2018.
67.  Yen Nee Lee, ‘IMF cuts its global growth forecasts, citing trade tensions 
between the US and its trading partners’, CNBC, 8 October 2018.
68.  Mark Valencia, ‘Are the US and China on the brink of a cold war?’, Asia 
Times, 2 October 2018.
69.  Lesley Wroughton & Patricia Zengerle, ‘U.S. sanctions China for buying 
Russian fighter jets, missiles’, Reuters, 20 September 2018.
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the same time Washington announced the sale of US$ 330 million worth 
of military equipment to Taiwan. 70 In mid-October the US despatched two 
US Air Force B-52 bombers to fly over the hotly-contested South China Sea, 
thus sending a clear message about China’s determination to continue to 
fly and sail «whenever international law allows».71 It should be noted that 
those flights came just a few weeks after a showdown between a Chinese 
destroyer and a US navy warship near the Spratly Islands.72 Meanwhile, the 
US president and Vice President Mike Pence accused Beijing of meddling in 
the upcoming American mid-term elections.73
The prevailing mood at the G20 Summit in Argentina was tense, 
especially considering the open hostility between the two parties during 
the APEC Summit in Papua New Guinea (17-18 November), where Mike 
Pence warned countries in the Indo-Pacific region not to fall into the trap 
of Chinese debt diplomacy, instead encouraging them to choose «the better 
option» of American development financing.74 During his sharply-worded 
speech Pence also stated that «Authoritarianism and aggression have no 
place in the Indo-Pacific», clearly referencing China.75
Xi Jinping and Donald Trump’s encounter in Buenos Aires, on the 
sidelines of the G20 Summit, was the first face-to-face meeting between 
the two leaders in nearly one year, and the first since Trump began the 
trade war.76 
Many observers in their analysis pointed to the importance of the lead-
ers’ personal chemistry as a means of dispelling the possibility of a new Cold 
War.77 According to Ni Feng, a specialist on Sino-US relations at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, «In the history of China-US relations, it has al-
ways been determined by the top leaders.»78 Zhang Baohui, an international 
70.  ‘U.S. approval of $330 million military sale to Taiwan draws China’s ire’, 
Reuters, 24 September 2018.
71.  Ryan Pickrell, ‘US B-52 bombers tore through the South China Sea in a 
power play ahead of a sit-down between the US and the Chinese defence chiefs’, 
Business Insider, 18 October 2018.
72.  Ryan Pickrell, ‘A Chinese warship reportedly threatened a US Navy destroy-
er in the South China Sea’, Business Insider, 4 November 2018.
73.  ‘China-US Relations: What’s Next?’, The Diplomat, 5 October 2018; ‘Mike 
Pence accuses China of meddling in US elections despite lack of evidence’, The Guard-
ian, 4 October 2018. 
74.  ‘Apec summit: Pence warns Indo-Pacific region against China’s debt diplo-
macy, says US offers «better option»’, The Straits Times, 17 November 2018. 
75.  Daniel Hurst, ‘From Japan, US VP Denounces «Authoritarianism and Ag-
gression»’, The Diplomat, 16 November 2018.
76.  Zhou Xin & Jun Mai, ‘Xi Jinping, Donald Trump agree to talks at G20 sum-
mit next month, source says’, South China Morning Post, 19 October 2018.
77.  Mark Landler & Jane Perlez, ‘At Stake When Xi and Trump Meet: The Pos-
sibility of a New Cold War’, The New York Times, 30 November 2018.
78.  Catherine Wong, ‘Will Donald Trump and Xi Jinping rekindle their «great 
chemistry» at the G20 summit?’, South China Morning Post, 26 November 2018.
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relations expert at Lingnan University in Hong Kong also agreed, arguing 
that a successful meeting would at least «slow down the momentum of a new 
Cold War», while a bad one would «make that irreversible.»79 In this sense, the 
meeting was considered as «a testament to how much trade and the personal 
chemistry between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi have come to dominate the rela-
tions between the United States and China. While these are only subplots in 
a larger drama that also includes a military contest in the Pacific and nuclear 
negotiations with North Korea, they could also define the next chapter in that 
relationship».80
After dinner, both presidents appeared satisfied with their «highly 
successful meeting». In particular, Trump referred to «an amazing and pro-
ductive meeting with unlimited possibilities for both the United States and 
China».81 
That said, at exactly the same moment the two leaders were dining 
together in Buenos Aires and agreeing to a «90-day trade truce», Meng 
Wanzhou, top executive and daughter of the founder of the Chinese tech 
giant Huawei, was arrested in Canada, at the request of the United States, 
for alleged violations of US sanctions to Iran.82 Meng was charged with con-
spiring to violate sanctions on Iran by doing business with Teheran through 
a subsidiary (Skycom) which she had tried to conceal. If the accusations were 
confirmed she risked a maximum penalty of 30 years in prison. It was im-
mediately evident to observers and analysts that Meng was a mere «hostage» 
in the Sino-American trade war. 83 
Tensions between US authorities and Huawei have been high since 
2016. Washington has long viewed Huawei and its close ties to the Chinese 
government as a threat to national security and the US has been investigat-
ing Huawei for possible violations of UN sanctions on Iran. The charges in-
clude bank fraud, obstruction of justice, and theft of technology.84 As report-
ed by Hu Xujing, editor in chief of the Chinese and English editions of the 
Global Times, the US was trying to find a way to attack Huawei and destroy 
its reputation. In other words, Meng’s arrest was not simply a case about 
the arrest of a woman, or about a company, but strictly related to the two 
giants’ technological rivalry, in particular the creation of the new-generation 
79.  Ibid.
80.  Mark Landler & Jane Perlez, ‘At Stake When Xi and Trump Meet: The Pos-
sibility of a New Cold War’, The New York Times, 30 November 2018.
81.  ‘Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the President’s Working 
Dinner with China’, 1 December 2018.
82. The White House, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the President’s Work-
ing Dinner with China, 1 December 2018 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-state-
ments/statement-press-secretary-regarding-presidents-working-dinner-china. 
83. Karishma Vashwani, ‘Huawei arrest of Meng Wanzhou: A «hostage» in a new 
US-China tech war’, BBC news, 6 December 2018.
84.  Rob Price & Troy Wolverton, ‘Canada arrested Huawei’s CFO, and the US 
is seeking to extradite her,’ Business Insider, 5 December 2018.
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5G computer and phone market and Huawei’s role in them. According to 
specialists and observers, this provided the rationale for Meng Wanzhou’s 
arrest. This was evident by the lively debate unleashed on social media by 
the intervention of the well-known economist Jeffrey Sachs. On 10 Decem-
ber, Sachs published a story entitled «The war on Huawei» stating that the 
Trump administration was unfairly targeting Meng Wanzhou. Washington 
had only ever levied heavy fines against senior executives of US companies 
similarly accused of violating its sanctions regime.85
6. «Two dogs strive for a bone, and the third runs away with it»: the unexpected 
consequences of the Sino-American trade war
One of the most interesting consequences of the China-US trade war 
was the thawing in relations between China and Japan. It was preceded by 
the revival of the trilateral negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
between China, Japan and South Korea. Another important effect was the 
joint strengthening of relations between China and the EU, despite some 
frictions related to the BRI. 
6.1. China-Japan: the pragmatic rapprochement
Interestingly, concern for the global economy caused by the unilateral 
US trade moves, especially its growing protectionist measures and trade ag-
gression, favoured the revival of the long-stalled China-Japan-South Korea 
FTA talks, as well as improving relations between Beijing and Tokyo.
At a forum held in Beijing on 19 September, representatives from 
China, Japan and South Korea vowed to accelerate negotiations for a trilat-
eral FTA, begun in 2012, which had seen slow progress due to political and 
economic differences among the three countries. Addressing the forum, 
Kim Jeongil, director general of the FTA Policy Bureau at South Korea’s 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, stated that the world was witnessing 
growing trade protectionism, which created urgency for completing talks 
on the China-Japan-South Korea FTA and other multilateral trade pacts.86 
Chinese economist Chen Zilei, director of the Research Center for 
Japanese Economics at the Shanghai University of International Business 
and Economics, agreed that while the acceleration of the trilateral FTA 
should not be considered a direct countermeasure against the US – given 
85.  Keegan Helmer, ‘US economist Jeffrey Sachs retreats from Twitter after 
criticising US’ treatment of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou’, South China Morning Post, 
1 January 2019. For a complete reading of Sachs’s story, see ‘The war on Huawei’, 
Project Syndicate, 11 December 2018.
86.  Wang Cong, ‘Chaos caused by US trade aggression spurs faster regional 
FTA talks’, The Global Times, 19 September 2018. 
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that Seoul and Tokyo remained close allies of Washington – nonetheless, 
growing US trade aggression and the protectionist climate promoted by 
the Trump presidency provided the catalyst to resume talks. 87 As men-
tioned, during the year under review other regional trade pacts have also 
seen accelerated negotiations, including the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), a trade pact between 16 Asian economies. 
At the same time many countries pursued bilateral trade deals; among 
them China accelerated FTA talks with the EU, New Zealand,88 while Ja-
pan signed a trade agreement with the EU. In Chen’s words: «This is the 
bright side of the US trade protectionism. It has pushed all these coun-
tries to accelerate FTA talks and try to set up a firewall against the US 
actions».89
Related to Trump’s aggressive stance on trade was the Japanese 
prime minister’s more convincing rapprochement to China, after the timid 
gestures in 2017.90 It concluded with Abe Shinzo’s visit to China at the end 
of October, the first formal bilateral visit by a Japanese leader to the country 
in nearly seven years.91 Though nominally intended to commemorate the 
40th anniversary of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the 
visit completed a quiet process of mutual accommodation over the year,92 
reflecting realism and self-interest on both sides. 
The event underscored Chinese president Xi Jinping’s efforts to 
reduce his country’s exposure to the US market but it indicated a certain 
amount of pragmatism on the part of the Japanese prime minister too. By 
reporting to journalists after meeting with Xi, Abe declared: «From compe-
tition to coexistence, Japanese and Chinese bilateral relations have entered 
a new phase», adding that he wanted «to carve out a new era for China and 
Japan». For his part, the Chinese president stated that the two neighbours 
had to move in a «new historic direction» by working together at a time of 
growing global «instability and uncertainty».93
87.  Ibid.
88.  In the last few years China has intensified its efforts to build a global trade 
network with greater use of FTAs in order to diversify its markets and counter pro-
tectionism. So far it has signed 17 FTAs with 25 countries and regions and is in talks 
over 12 new or upgraded FTA deals. In addition, there is a list of FTAs under consid-
eration. For the list of China’s FTA agreements see the official website of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml. 
89.  Wang Cong, ‘Chaos caused by US trade aggression spurs faster regional 
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The Diplomat, 24 October 2018;
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Relations?’, The Brookings Institution, 25 October 2018.
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In other words, while for Beijing the meeting was about pacifying its 
neighbourhood so that it could concentrate on challenges coming from the 
US, for Tokyo it was an important occasion to recalibrate Sino-Japanese 
relations, focusing on deepening economic exchanges while putting aside 
political problems. Japan was aware that despite the security concerns, the 
country’s return to economic growth had been in part fueled by the Chinese 
economy’s growth, and that any sustained economic growth in Japan would 
necessarily include more, not less, trade and engagement with China.94
The meeting in Beijing was preceded by another bilateral encounter 
on 12 September during Abe and Xi’s visit to Vladivostok to attend the 
Eastern Economic Forum. Abe reported that the Japan-China relationship 
had «return to normal track». This was especially so after an important 
agreement had been reached in May, following a decade of talks regarding 
the establishment of a security hotline to defuse maritime confrontations.95 
Besides the hotline, the agreement provided for regular meetings between 
both nations’ defense officials and a mechanism for their naval vessels to 
communicate at sea to avert maritime incidents. This agreement served to 
enhance bilateral ties strained by historical animosity as well as the dispute 
concerning ownership of islets in the East China Sea. The October meeting 
was a clear demonstration of both sides being able to reach a mutual accom-
modation, «under the shadow of Trump».96
6.2. The enemy of my enemy is my friend. The consequences for China-EU 
relations
The China-US trade war, and more generally Trump’s attacks against 
the global system, represented an occasion for China to strengthen its rela-
tions with Brussels,97 despite the growing tensions between the two parties. 
These were due to both the disruptive effects of the BRI on the continent, and 
the Chinese strategy towards the Central and South European countries, car-
ried out with the so-called 16+1 Group (or CEEC+1 Forum, 中国与中东欧
国家合作).98 This was particularly evident during the 20th China-EU Summit. 
94. Stephen R. Nagy, ‘Can Japan-China relations return to «normal»?’, The Ja-
pan Times, 23 October 2018.
95.  ‘Japan and China agree on security hotline after a decade of talks’, CNBC, 
9 May 2018. 
96. K. Olsen, ‘Japan’s Abe will meet China’s Xi – under the shadow of Trump’, 
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amid US trade disputes’, Handelsblatt, 17 July 2018. 
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The China-EU Summit was preceded by Trump’s declarations during 
an interview with CBS at the President’s golf resort in Turnberry (Scotland) 
– aired on «Face the Nation» on 15 July – when he defined the European 
Union as a «foe» of the United States.99 That statement became part of 
Washington’s constant criticism of NATO’s European allies for not spending 
enough on defense.100 Although it was not new for a US president to push 
NATO members to spend more on defence, nonetheless the harshness and 
frequency of Trump’s attacks were without precedent.101
The importance of the 20th EU-China Summit was manifest in its 
lengthy final Joint Statement; due mainly to disagreements over granting 
«market economy» status to China, and other disputes over the South China 
Sea and trade, the previous two summits had ended without joint state-
ments. Interestingly, at 2018’s summit, China mentioned neither the mar-
ket-economy topic nor the issue of the arms embargo.102
On paper, the main achievement of the summit was a Chinese agree-
ment that the World Trade Organization had to be reformed if it was to 
survive the «Trumpian times».103 During a meeting with Donald Tusk (pres-
ident of the European Council) and Jean-Claude Junker (president of the 
European Commission) on the sidelines of the summit, Xi Jinping told his 
guests that China and the EU could not watch the old world order be de-
stroyed and a vacuum being created. For his part Tusk, referring to the Hel-
sinki meeting between Trump and Putin, stated that «the architecture of the 
world is changing before our very eyes» and urged Europe, China, Russia 
and America «not to destroy this order but to improve it».104 That said, the 
summit was characterized by a particular closeness between China and the 
European Union, which was by no means obvious. 
The fact that the 16+1 Group summit – held in Sofia on 6-7 July – 
was postponed by almost half a year from its original schedule, at Beijing’s 
initiative, to only a few days before the EU-China Summit, irritated many 
negro, and Serbia). Among these last, four are recognized as candidates to member-
ship (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia), while Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is officially recognized as potential candidate, Sarajevo having submitted a member-
ship application. In the framework of the Initiative, China has defined three poten-
tial priorities areas for economic cooperation, i.e. infrastructure, high technology, 
and green technologies, all key issues within the BRI. 
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officials in Brussels and left some EU 16+1 members embarrassed.105 For 
example, Poland – the biggest European 16+1 economy – was represented 
in Sofia by its deputy prime minister, while its prime minister stayed home 
to attend a pilgrimage.106 
The main reason for the postponement resided in the fact that Bei-
jing remained unmoved by the loud calls from Berlin, Brussels and Paris 
to tone down its 16+1 activities.107 Rather, China had sought an intensifi-
cation and broader institutionalization of the Group, while welcoming the 
interest expressed by Austria and Greece (16+1 observers) to full mem-
bership of the format. Furthermore, Beijing had not given up the idea 
of establishing additional sub-regional grouping in both Northern and 
Southern Europe.108 
But the majority of frictions were to be found in the perceived ag-
gressiveness of the BRI, since the vast majority of BRI projects in the CEE 
region remained firmly in the hands of Chinese leaders and companies. It 
was apparent that China’s BRI-related infrastructure projects were creat-
ing an economic and financial instability in the EU’s regional neighbour-
hood, through the so-called «debt trap», i.e. the debts incurred by coun-
tries as they took on BRI loans from Beijing, leaving them vulnerable to 
China’s influence.109 Moreover, in the majority of cases those projects did 
not respect EU rules and standards for building large-scale infrastructures, 
from transportation to energy and communications. These were some of 
the reasons why, in April, the overwhelming majority of EU members’ 
ambassadors to China –with the exception of the Hungarian – signed an 
internal report sharply criticizing China’s new Silk Road project, denounc-
ing it as «designed to hamper free trade and put Chinese companies at an 
advantage».110 In the report, leaked to the German newspaper Handelsblatt 
Global, the 27 EU ambassadors blamed China’s intention to shape global-
ization to suit its own interests. Additionally, they warned that European 
companies would refuse to sign any contract if China failed to adhere to 
the European principles of transparency in public procurement, as well 
as environmental and social standards. At the same time, EU officials ac-
cused China of attempting to divide Europe in reference to its strategy 
with individual member states, such as Hungary and Greece, which both 
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relied on Chinese investments, and had in the past shown their suscepti-
bility to Beijing’s pressures.111
The Ambassadors’ report was intended to be presented during the 
China-EU summit in July, but reportedly it was not. Maybe the trade war 
unleashed by Trump and more generally his widespread offensive against 
the multilateral system of the last seven decades, and his attacks on the 
European allies, contributed to question everything.112 
Many of the criticisms made by the US president in defense of his 
protectionist stance were, as always, that the European countries had being 
moving to China for a long time.
7. The Belt and Road Initiative on its 5th anniversary
In 2018, as China’s Belt and Road Initiative turned five years old, 
it continued to develop and become more widespread and to growing 
criticism.
During those five years, the BRI has experienced a great evolution, 
from an initiative solely focused on infrastructure to one which also includes 
industry, technology, cultural, legal and environmental components. At the 
same time, the BRI has been enlarging its geographical scope by shifting its 
focus from the historic Silk Road region to the entire globe. Chinese leaders 
have also been setting increasingly ambitious goals for the Initiative: from 
economic development to constructing a «community of shared destiny for 
all mankind». Finally, its inclusion in the party constitution confirmed its 
status as a long-term project, much like Deng Xiaoping’s «reform and open-
ing-up» policy.
According to Xinhua, in the year under review Beijing signed 123 
cooperation documents on BRI development with 105 countries (in Asia, 
Africa, Europe, Latin America, and the South Pacific region) and 26 similar 
documents with 29 international organizations.113 
In particular, the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) gave China the opportunity to sign Memorandum of 
Understandings (MoUs) with 37 African countries (and the African Union), 
which, according to Xia Qing, an official with the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), accounted for 70 percent of the 53 African 
nations attending the summit. 
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On 5 December, Portugal joined the list of European countries to 
sign such a memorandum.114 Interestingly, Lisbon not only signed, despite 
pressure against doing so from both the European Union and the US State 
Department, but the communiqué stated that both parties agreed to jointly 
encourage the strengthening of the EU-China Strategic Partnership, and 
work towards developing «synergies» between the BRI and EU connectivity 
and investment strategies.115 
At the same time, views on the BRI grew increasingly polarized, 
not only between countries, but also within them. The most emblematic 
cases regarded the US, with the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issuing 
a warning to Panama and other nations in the region about the potential 
dangers of accepting Chinese investments,116 and the EU, with the afore-
mentioned letter of condemnation of the BRI signed by 27 of the 28 EU 
ambassadors in Beijing (see § 6.2.).
A remarkable example of the growing polarization within countries 
occurred in the Australian state of Victoria. In October it independently 
joined the BRI by signing a MoU with Beijing, despite the resistance of 
Canberra.117 
7.1. The growing focus on debt and international standards
As already analysed in the previous issue of Asia Maior,118 China’s 
financing and building infrastructures in developing countries, labelled 
«debt-trap diplomacy», and the inadequacy of Chinese projects which did 
not respect international standards, were the subject of severe criticism. 
This is why some countries have actively resisted China’s calls for 
them to sign BRI MoUs, while simultaneously trying to work with Beijing 
to improve the debt sustainability of the Initiative and ensure it meets 
international standards. To this end, the British government appointed 
Sir Douglas Flint, former Chairman of HSBC, as its BRI envoy, to ensure 
that projects become more bankable and open to financiers from around 
the world.119 
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Much of that criticism continues to focus on the debt incurred by 
countries as they take on BRI loans from China.120 A study conducted by 
three researchers from the Washington-based think tank Center for Global 
Development (CGD), confirmed that BRI elevates sovereign debt risks in 
some countries involved in the Initiative.121 In particular, of the 68 countries 
identified as potential borrowers, 23 were found to be already at a «quite 
high» risk of debt distress. Among those countries was Sri Lanka, which in 
December 2017 transferred the control of Hambantota port, built using 
Chinese loans, to China Merchants Port Holdings, a state-owned port op-
erator.122 Furthermore, the study revealed that eight of those 23 countries, 
namely, Djibouti, the Maldives, Laos, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, would most likely face difficulties in repaying 
their debt because of future financing related to BRI projects. Pakistan was 
considered by far the largest country at high risk, with Beijing reportedly 
financing about 80 percent of its estimated US$ 62 billion additional debt. 
Laos was no better, considering its several BRI-linked projects which includ-
ed a US$ 6.7 billion China-Laos railway that represented nearly half the 
country’s GDP, leading the IMF to warn that it might threaten the country’s 
ability to service its debts.123 The eight-countries list also included a Eu-
ropean country – Montenegro – that saw a sharp increase in its debt after 
accepting a Chinese loan in order to construct a highway linking the port of 
Bar to Serbia. However, the project risked collapse as Podgorica’s debt was 
expected to approach 80 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by the 
end of 2018. Again, the IMF intervened stating the country could not afford 
to take on any more debt to finish the ambitious project.124
These episodes were symptomatic of the multiple setbacks and fail-
ings that Xi Jinping’s Initiative face. Furthermore, they have the potential 
to derail China’s carefully-laid long term plans for achieving its national 
«dream».
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